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Abstract
This paper examines the determinants of unemployment duration in the framework of a competing
risks model, where the destination states are employment and inactivity. The major innovation is the
use of a split-population approach to accommodate the presence of defective risks in the context of
the competing risks model. Certain of the regressors that affect the conditional hazards are allowed
to influence defective risks.  Unobserved individual heterogeneity among the susceptible populations
is also controlled for. Access to unemployment benefits and age are accorded special emphasis
because of their influence on defective risks and escape rates.I.  Introduction
This paper uses a competing risks model of unemployment duration in which exit from
unemployment can result from finding a job or becoming inactive, which destinations are properly
viewed as behaviorally distinct states (Flinn and Heckman, 1983).  Use of a competing risks
specification while familiar is not commonplace in empirical unemployment duration analysis (but
see  Han and Hausman, 1990; Meyer, 1990; Fallick, 1991; and Narendranathan and Stewart, 1993).
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 Altogether less familiar, is the notion that risks may be defective.  This possibility is especially
relevant in European labor markets, and our focus will be on Portuguese unemployment data. In
Europe the arrival rate of job offers is low, leading to long unemployment duration (10.5 percent in
the EU in 1998) and a high share of long-term unemployed in the jobless count (50.1 percent)
(OECD, 1999: 19, 242).
Whereas in single-risk models one aggregates over a number of exit modes, for competing
risks one has to confront the possibility that some exit routes are simply not viable. Furthermore, if
indeed there exists a subpopulation with a zero hazard rate, we should observe a declining aggregate
hazard function.  This phenomenon is no more than a special case of unobserved individual
heterogeneity.
Once one allows for defective risks, there is scope for determining the factors that influence
the possibility of being "immune" to a specific type of transition. The approach is not very different
from conventional selection models or, more pertinently, zero inflated Poisson regression models.
 Although identification remains an issue, information that individuals with given characteristics
tend to exhibit a flat (specific) survival function after some point should assist in the identification
of defective marginal distributions.
The empirical model used here reflects the sample information and the sample plan
(observation over a fixed interval).  We use a grouped duration model in which remaining duration
is conditioned on elapsed duration.  A flexible semiparametric baseline hazard function is specified,2
namely, a piecewise-constant hazard function with 13-segments.  Modes of failure are treated as
independent competing risks. This competing risks framework is next extended to encompass
defective risks, which are then allowed to depend on the characteristics of the individual while
allowing for gamma heterogeneity of the "susceptible" subpopulation.
To anticipate some of our more important findings, we report that access to benefits increases
the proportion of those who will never get an acceptable job offer (the long-term jobless, or
"employment-immunes"); decreases the escape rate into employment among those who will get such
offers ("employment-susceptibles"); and decreases the hazard rate into inactivity of those who
actively consider that destination state ("inactivity-susceptibles"). For its part, age increases the
proportion of employment-immunes; decreases the proportion of the long-term active
("inactive-immunes"); and increases the hazards into inactivity of inactive-susceptibles. These
effects, and the implications of the split-population model for conventional duration analysis, are
carefully discussed in the paper.
II.  Data
Our data are taken from the nationally representative Portuguese quarterly employment
surveys (Inquérito ao Emprego), conducted by the National Institute of Statistics (INE) (Instituto
Nacional de Estatistica).  The sample period is 1992(2)-1997(4), the starting date being dictated by
changes in survey design after the first quarter of 1992.
The quarterly employment survey has a quasi-longitudinal capacity.  One sixth of the sample
rotates out each quarter, allowing us to track transitions out of unemployment for up to five quarters,
and hence pursue the conditional approach. Transition rates are obtained simply by identifying those
unemployed individuals in the survey, and their elapsed duration in a given quarter, who move out
of unemployment over the subsequent quarter. The destination states of previously unemployed
workers can also be identified. For present purposes, we distinguish between the two destination
states of employment and inactivity.3
More technically the stock sampling basis of the employment survey provides backward
recurrence times for the relevant labor market state.  Information on forward recurrence times has
thus to be inferred.  Specifically, remaining duration of unemployment, conditional on elapsed
duration, distributed as the entrant conditional density function (Lancaster, 1990).
Each survey contains information on the length of the current unemployment spell (in
months) and the unemployment benefit status of the worker. It is also possible to track time to
exhaustion of benefits because maximum duration is a function of age. We eschew using this benefit
measure here, but the seven-element structure of the age regressor is designed to exactly mimic the
stepped increases in benefit duration entitlement with age. We note parenthetically that the
replacement rate is to all intents and purposes fixed in Portugal (at 65 percent).  Accordingly, it is
not deployed as an independent variable.  (Neither duration of benefits nor the replacement rate
changed over the sample period.)
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The employment survey contains additional information on variables that may be expected
to shift the baseline hazard up or down, namely, the individual's age, level of schooling, marital
status, tenure on the last job, whether he or she was a new entrant, and the reason for job loss.  The
local unemployment rate, derived from separate sources, was also allowed to influence the baseline
hazard function.
Since we also wish to account for defective risks, some of the selfsame arguments are used
to estimate the split-population regression equations. All the variables that are specific to the
individual are used here (namely, being married, schooling, tenure, and age). The general point is
that we are interested in considering variables that affect the probability of being a long-term
survivor. Age is expected to be critical in this regard, and is now expressed in continuous form. 
Unemployment benefits and the unemployment rate are also used as arguments: the former because
it the key policy variable; the latter because it is expected to inform on discouragement. Descriptive
statistics are provided in the Appendix table.
The sole restrictions placed on the data were that the individual be unemployed at the time
of the quarterly survey, male, aged between 16 and 64 years, and resident in mainland Portugal.4
Given the possibility of sample attrition, we also ensured that individuals appearing in contiguous
surveys with the same identifier were in fact the same individual. The sample size is 9,451
individuals.
III.  Methodology
The basic empirical model used here exploits the particular nature of our data set. It will be
recalled that we can follow the individual (transitions) over a period of up to 6 (5) quarters. Given
this sampling plan, unemployment transitions are observed over a fixed period of 3 months.
The instantaneous escape rate function to destination j , j=1, 2 ( in our case, j denotes the two
destination states of employment and inactivity) has been called the cause-specific hazard function.
It gives, for a set of covariates x,  the instantaneous probability of exiting unemployment at t, into
destination j, given that the individual stayed unemployed until t
t
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The relevant information is given by the observed elapsed duration of unemployment, the
mode of exit out of unemployment and, for continued unemployment, the indication of an
incomplete duration (i.e. the censoring indicator).  Our estimation is thus based on data provided by
the triplet (T, J, C), where C is the indicator of a censored duration.
The model has a conventional competing risks interpretation. In this framework, a latent
duration (Tj) unemployment attaches to each exit mode. We only observe the minimum of each latent
variable. If risks are assumed to be independent, with continuous duration, this model simplifies to
separate single-cause hazard models (but see below).
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Assuming proportionality of covariates, the cause-specific hazard function in equation (2)
can be rewritten for the arbitrary baseline hazard θ 0j(t)      
[ ] j j j x t X t β θ θ ' exp ) ( ) ; ( 0 = .                   (3)
Recall, however, that our information on elapsed duration of unemployment is grouped into
monthly intervals (while transitions can solely be identified over a fixed interval of 3 months).
Consider a time axis that is divided into K intervals by points c1, c2, … , and cK-1, and let M=m
denote the occurrence of an exit in the interval [ ) t t c c , 1 − , where t is the realization of a discrete
random unemployment duration variable M∈ (1,..., K). In practice, we use 13 intervals and employ
a piecewise-constant baseline hazard function (where the hazard function is assumed to be constant
within each interval).
4,5 The probability that an event occurs in the m
th interval, and that such an exit
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associated with the marginal distribution for each latent duration, Tj, in terms of the specific hazard
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of the two specific “survivor” functions.
Recall, however that the individuals in our sample are observed over a fixed interval of 3
months (Lancaster, 1990, p. 183); that is, at the time of the first survey the elapsed duration of
unemployment is recorded. Three months later, the labor status of the same individual is observed,
providing us with information on whether he or she had left unemployment and, if so, the destination6
state (employment or inactivity). With this sample plan, we need to condition on elapsed duration
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where  imj δ assumes the value 1 if the individual i exits to destination j during the m
th interval, and





imj im i δ δ identifies completed durations, so that,  im δ − 1  equals one
for a censored observation. 
Up to this point we have assumed non-defective risks; that is, all destination states are
considered (viable) ex-ante. We now have to account for the possibility that certain or all choices
may be ruled out. Technically speaking, latent duration may not be finite (i.e. marginal specific
survival functions do not converge to zero, and thus marginal cumulative density functions do not
integrate to one), leading to a defective distribution. This approach has been used in the econometric
literature in the context a “split-population” framework  for a single risk (Schmidt and Witte, 1989).
6
In the context of a grouped duration model, a straightforward way to incorporate the
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where (1-Pj) is the probability of a defective risk associated with destination j. Taking Pj as
additional unknown parameters to be estimated, the new   paramaterization of the specific “survivor”
function can be employed in a likelihood function identical to (6). In order to  guarantee that Pj lies
between 0 and 1, we employ the logit reparameterization for  ) exp( 1 ) exp( j j j P µ µ + = . A natural
extension of this model is to allow Pj to depend on a set of regressors z, leading to a logit link
function  ) ' exp( 1 ) ' exp( j j j j j z z P γ µ γ µ + + + = (see Yamaguchi, 1992). That is, we specify the
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Finally, we attempt to accommodate the presence of unobserved individual heterogeneity by
assuming a multiplicative error term associated with each specific hazard function. We further
assume that the errors are gamma distributed with mean 1 and variance 
2
j σ and are uncorrelated
(mantaining the risk independence assumption).
7 We proceed by redefining the specific “survivor”
function using the well-known result for gamma mixtures with grouped data 






− Λ + = .




m S P P S + − = 1
~





) 8 ( .
) 1 ( 1
) 1 ( 1
) 1 ( 1



























m j j j
j
























































Λ + + −


















Λ + + −




     
The ML routine from the econometric package TSP (Time Series Processor) was employed
to obtain the maximum likelihood estimates. In each case, starting values from a simple single risk
specification were used.8
IV.  Findings
Results of fitting our multiple destination model are provided in Table 1. The first two
columns of the table give results for the basic competing risks specification. The next two
columns give results for the same specification now supplemented with a control for gamma
heterogeneity for the susceptible population.  Estimates for the most parsimonious version of the
defective risks model are provided in the fifth and sixth columns. Results for a specification in
which defective risks are affected by certain of the regressors used in the conditional model are
contained in the seventh and eighth columns.  Finally, our preferred specification in which in
addition to defective risks we also allow for gamma heterogeneity of the susceptible population
are given in the last two columns of the table.
(Table 1 near here)
Results for the basic competing risks model indicate that the disincentive effects of access
to unemployment benefits are similar for the two destination states. Recipients are 42.3 (40.0)
percent less likely to enter into employment (inactivity) than their non-recipient counterparts. The
effects of the other regressors do, however, differ more markedly across destination state. Thus,
the strongest depressing effects of age on transitions into employment are found among the two
oldest age groups, whereas for inactivity statistically negative effects are confined to the two
youngest age groups.
Familiarly, transitions into reemployment are higher among married workers, those who
have completed a fixed-term contract, and those losing a job by reason of mass (rather than
individual) layoffs, and are lower for higher tenure workers.  In each case, opposite results are
obtained in respect of transitions into inactivity.  Interestingly, however, schooling does not seem
to affect transition rates into either destination state, while higher unemployment rates lead to
reduced transitions into both employment and inactivity (the coefficient estimate is statistically
significant for inactivity).
A number of these results change when we allow for unobserved individual heterogeneity
via a gamma-distributed error term.  Most obvious are the sharply elevated disincentive effects9
of unemployment benefits.  Access to benefits now reduces transitions into each destination state
by 64 percent (but see below). Most of the other coefficient estimates also increase in absolute
magnitude.
Note, however, that at this stage we are assuming that each individual is likely to exit
unemployment either by obtaining a job or becoming inactive. If there are defective risks, the
parametric specification for unobserved individual heterogeneity might not adequately capture
this type of heterogeneity.  Here we are referring to split-population heterogeneity, that is, a
mixture of two subpopulations one of which has a zero probability of an event - say, exit into a
given destination.
The basic defective risks model (columns five and six) indicates that a small number of
the unemployed do not receive acceptable offers of employment. Consider the µ  parameters for
each destination state. In the case of reemployment, it can be inferred that
employment-susceptibles constitute 94.4 percent of the unemployed population (i.e. exp 2.821/(1
+ exp 2.821).  Alternatively put, some 4.6 percent of this sample are in fact permanently jobless
or "employment immunes"; they will either drift into long-term (actually permanent)
unemployment or become inactive.  As far as inactivity is concerned, the inference is that 45.7
percent of unemployed workers will never consider this destination state.  These may be called
the permanently active or "inactive immunes."  For the 54.3 percent of unemployed workers who
consider inactivity (the inactivity-susceptibles), the outcome can of course be either inactivity or
reemployment.  Conditional on facing employment or inactivity, it can be seen that transitions
are reduced by access to benefits. The disincentive effects are lower than in the two preceding
columns but of the same order of magnitude as reported for the most parsimonious competing
risks specification.  The qualitative effects of the other regressors are qualitatively unchanged as
between the three specifications.10
For each destination state, the surviving fraction is next allowed to be influenced by the six
regressors shown in the lower panel of columns seven and eight of the table.  We estimate that,
among individuals with average characteristics for continuous variables and zero values for the
dummy variables (namely, non-recipients and unmarried individuals), the probability of receiving
an acceptable job offer is now 89.5 percent, while the corresponding percentage of those who will
never enter inactivity falls to 42.7 percent.   Variables increasing the probability the probability of
being permanently jobless are unemployment benefits, age, and tenure.  On the other hand, being
married decreases the probability of observing a zero hazard rate.  The signs of these variables match
the effect of the corresponding regressors affecting the conditional baseline hazard (i.e. for
employment-susceptibles).  (The age variable will be considered in more detail below).  Thus,
unemployment benefits, age, and tenure increase the proportion of employment-immunes, while
being married reduces that proportion.
As far as inactivity is concerned, the variables of the split-population equation are generally
poorly determined.  The proportion of inactive-immunes is increasing in schooling, tenure, and
unemployment, and decreasing in unemployment benefit receipt, age, and being married.  Alone
among these covariates, the (reduced) probability of being an inactive-immune is statistically
significant for schooling.  The association is sensible.  When we consider the conditional hazard into
inactivity, it can be seen that unemployment benefit receipt reduces hazard rates and age increases
them.  Both results again seem sensible.  The negative effect of schooling on the hazard rates of
inactive-susceptibles is also reassuring as indeed are the similar effects of being married and laid off.
 That said, it remains something of a puzzle that transitions into inactivity are decreasing in
unemployment.
Our preferred specification is given in the final two columns of the table, where we
accommodate unobserved individual heterogeneity of the susceptible subpopulations.  An initial
observation is that the disincentive effects of unemployment benefits on escape rates into
employment and inactivity effects are modestly higher when we take account of unobserved11
heterogeneity (though nowhere near as large as in the heterogeneity-augmented competing risks
model assuming non-defective risks).  Specifically, benefits lower escape rates by approximately 50
percent for both destination-specific hazard functions.
Now 90.6 percent of unemployed workers will ultimately receive acceptable job offers and
28.7 percent will never consider inactivity, so that one effect of the heterogeneity correction is to
reduce defective risks for inactivity.  Variables increasing the probability that an individual is
permanently jobless (i.e. destined to become long-term unemployed or inactive) are again
unemployment benefits, age, tenure, and (rising) unemployment.  Also as before, being married
sharply reduces the probability of a defective risk for employment.  In all cases, the coefficient
estimates are increased in absolute magnitude, although the effects of schooling and the
unemployment rate are imprecisely estimated.
With respect to those transitions into inactivity, the main result is again that schooling
decreases the fraction of those who will never enter inactivity.  Expressed differently, the fraction
of individuals with a flat hazard at zero decreases.
Finally, the principal effects of the regressors on the specific hazards are qualitatively
unchanged.  The escape rates of employment-susceptibles are now more strongly influenced (in the
expected direction) by labor market entry and tenure on the last job.  For inactivity-susceptibles, the
coefficient estimates are generally increased in absolute magnitude (especially age) although, with
the notable exception of the marital status variable, they are not noticeably more precisely estimated.
(Figures 1 through 4 near here) 
The crucial role of unemployment benefits in retarding transitions out of unemployment is
now addressed in more detail.  Hazard functions by destination state are charted in Figures 1 and 2.
 The estimates are again based on the defective risks model contained in the fifth specification of
Table 1.
8  (A fourth-order polynomial was used to fit the curves.)  For the employment cause-specific
hazard function there is a tendency for escape rates to fall with jobless duration for both recipients
and nonrecipients alike.  The decline for non-recipients is fairly sharp over the first 12 to 18 months12
of the jobless spell, after which point the decline is modest - with a slight uptick after the twenty-fifth
month.  For recipients, the decline is both more muted and shorter lived.  (Figure 4 makes a purely
technical point that, if there were no employment immunes, the employment cause-specific hazard
function for non-recipients would indicate a rise in escape rates a little after twelve months into the
jobless spell.)
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Transitions into inactivity display a quite different pattern.  For both non-recipients and
recipients the hazard rises and then falls, peaking at around 12 months for the former and 18  months
for the latter.  As before, escape rates into inactivity are uniformly higher for non-recipients than
recipients.  While we have no cogent explanation for the shape of the hazard function, there is no
suggestion that transitions into inactivity are an end-state realized after fruitless search for
employment.  This conclusion is underscored by Figure 3, which identifies the share of all monthly
transitions that are into inactivity.  In this case, the differences between recipients and non-recipients
are muted, both functions peaking at a little under 30 percent after 18 months.
(Figures 5 and 6 near here)
Survival functions in aggregate (i.e. proper survival functions) and specific survival functions
for the two destination states are given in Figures 5 and 6, respectively.
10  From Figure 5 it can be
seen that median joblessness is around 6 months for non-recipients and over 16 months for
recipients.  Figure 6 makes it transparent that the survival rates for inactivity do not go to zero -
although of course the same holds true for employment.  In short, defective risks characterize both
destination states.  Consistent with the information provided earlier on the cause-specific hazard
functions, survival rates for activity are much higher than for employment and in each case higher
for recipients than non-recipients.
(Figures 7 and 8 near here)
Our analysis has also indicated that age is an important determinant of escape rates out of
unemployment. Figures 7 and 8 reconsider the association between age and destination state (see also
Table 2, below).  Figure 7 indicates that the proportion employment-immunes - which we interpret13
as being those who will never receive acceptable job offers - rises with age and in the same manner
for recipients and non-recipients alike.  On the other hand, Figure 8 shows that proportion of
inactivity-immunes is decreasing in age. Both effects are reinforcing in the unemployment duration
of older workers.  This result reinforces the disincentive effects.
(Table 2 near here)
Table 2 concludes with some simulation results on the effects of unemployment benefits and
age on unemployment, again based on the final specification in Table 1.  First consider survival rates
in joblessness aggregated over both destination states.  As can be seen from the table, survival rates
decline over the jobless spell and are increasing in age and benefit receipt.  The decline in survival
rates with duration is more pronounced for non-recipients than recipients but age is more important
than recipiency in arresting the decline in survival rates. Similarly, although the pattern of survival
rates at 3, 12, and 36 months points to greater persistence among recipients and older individuals,
the increase in survival rates with age always exceeds the corresponding increase in survival rates
with benefits.  Nevertheless, the effect of benefit receipt is profound; for example, at 36 months the
survival rates of recipients are more than double those of non-recipients for each of the three age
groups.
The entries for defective risks show that the proportion of those who never get a  job offer
rises steadily with age and with benefit receipt by age.  Roughly 3 (8) percent of 20-year old
non-recipients (recipients) will not receive an acceptable job offer, rising to 37 (63) percent in the
case of their  50 year-old counterparts.  The proportions of those who will never transition into
inactivity declines with age and benefit receipt in roughly equal proportion (see also Table 8).
Finally, the estimated median jobless duration values - shown at the foot of the table - while
again confirming the important role of age and benefits in retarding transitions out of unemployment,
make the point that destination state matters. We present two sets of estimates of median duration.
 In one case, we admit that an individual can move into either employment or inactivity, consistent
with a standard measure of (median) unemployment duration.  In the other, we simulate a situation14
where the possibility of entering inactivity is precluded, and compute the length of time it will now
take to find employment.  It can be seen that with the latter exclusion, duration would increase from
5 to 7 weeks for a 20-year-old non-recipient and from 11 to 14 weeks for his recipient counterpart.
 By the same token, duration would rise from 11 to 24 weeks for a 50-year-old non-recipient.
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Simulation of median duration for a single risk is straightforward in the framework of a competing
risks model where all the other risks are taken to be absent.
V.  Conclusions
The main lesson of this paper is that a substantial proportion of (Portuguese) long-term
unemployment can be explained either by the failure of individuals to receive acceptable job offers
or by their non-consideration of the inactivity option. We showed that some factors preempt options
at the same time as they independently shape transition rates out of unemployment (i.e. for viable
options).  Defective risks are clearly manifested in cause-specific survival functions.
All of this is consistent with the conventional view of ossified European labor markets. The
argument is that high firing costs not only decrease flows into unemployment but also strengthen the
bargaining power of insiders.  The result is a lower arrival rate of job offers, and higher
unemployment duration to reestablish equilibrium (Blanchard and Portugal, 1999).  In this setting,
it is indeed likely that an important subset of the unemployed population (especially older
individuals) will see their already slim chances of receiving acceptable job offers being reduced to
zero.
We singled out for special attention the role of age and unemployment benefits. Each has
statistically significant effects on hazard rates and defective risks. Age increases the proportion of
those who will never receive acceptable job offers and symmetrically decreases the proportion of
those active in the labor market.  It also independently increases hazards into inactivity.
Unemployment  benefit effects are a little more tricky to the extent that even in Portugal one cannot
be a recipient for ever. Subject to this caveat - although benefits can be received in one form or other15
for up to 5 years - benefits are associated with increases in the proportion of those who will never
find work.  Benefits also decrease the hazard rates into employment and inactivity among those for
whom these options are not preempted.
In search of a more adequate specification of unemployment duration, modern duration
analysis should not simply recognize alternative destination states (and here it would also seem
profitable to consider a variety of employment options) but also explicitly incorporate defective
risks. The relevance of the latter is most obvious in terms of understanding long-term unemployment
and interpreting negative duration dependence. In general, if there are defective risks to begin with,
and these are ignored in modeling unemployment duration, there is a bias toward a declining hazard
function that results from the mixture of the two subpopulations.  (In our case, there are in essence
two hazard functions: one that declines before trending up, and another for which the hazard rate is
zero.  In conjunction, they produce a declining hazard.)
Endnotes
1.  The approach is rooted in the biostatistics literature, where the context of competing risks is the presence of
different diseases.  In this setting, one can simulate the effect on the expected life of an individual resulting from
the elimination of a single risk/disease (see Cox and Oakes, 1985; Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1980).
2.  Strictly speaking, the unemployment benefit variable includes two types of unemployment benefits:
unemployment insurance (UI) proper, and unemployment assistance. The latter, lower-order benefits are
payable to those previously employed individuals who do not meet the service eligibility criterion for UI (18
months insured employment within the last two years) and to UI-exhaustees on a means-tested basis.  The
survey does not distinguish between the two. However, it is possible crudely to identify the two types of benefit
recipient on the basis of tenure on the last job. (Crude, insofar as some of those thereby classified as
unemployment assistance recipients may actually have been eligible for UI benefits proper if they had
accumulated 18-months' insured employment on more than one job.) Suffice it to say here that purging
low-tenure workers from the sample of unemployment benefit recipients did not qualitatively alter any of the
findings reported below.
3.  That is, all events other than the one under consideration are taken as censored.
4.  As noted earlier, we use month as the time calendar unit.  In specifying the baseline hazard function, we used
3 initial intervals of 1 month length, 7 subsequent intervals of 3 months' duration, then 2 intervals of 6 months,
and a final, open-ended interval.
5.  See Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) for the derivation of the piecewise-constant hazard as a grouped version of
the proportional hazards model, and Han and Hausman (1990) for an ordered-response model with competing
risks.
6.  See also Pudney and Thomas (1995) for an extension of the split-population model to multiple destinations,
and Maller and Zhou (1996) for an exploitation of duration models with long-term survivors.7.  Cockx (1997) presents a similar treatment of unobserved individual heterogeneity in the context of competing
risks.
8.  The hazard functions in question are unconditional, that is, they reflect the presence of immunes on the
transitions out of unemployment. Average values for the covariates were used in their construction.
9.  The same holds for the recipient employment cause-specific hazard function.
10.  Specific "survival" functions are not proper because, with competing risks, they fail to integrate to one.  We
use the expression "specific survival" for convenience, following Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980).  Furthermore,
with defective risks, even marginal survival functions will be degenerate.
11.  Note that the bottom-right cell entry is undefined for 50-year-old recipients for the simple reason that 63.2
percent of this group never receive acceptable job offers.References
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Variable  Employment Inactivity Employment Inactivity Employment Inactivity Employment Inactivity Employment Inactivity
UB -0.555 -0.511 -1.012 -1.011 -0.595 -0.558 -0.439 -0.485 -0.691 -0.685
(0.067) (0.165) (0.350) (0.350) (0.073) (0.197) (0.098) (0.346) (0.158) (0.365)
AGE GROUP                    
25-29 -0.008 -0.434 0.166 -0.477 0.139 -0.282 0.112 -0.461 0.235 -0.617
-(0.080) (0.217) (0.166) (0.425) (0.084) (0.265) (0.079) (0.273) (0.149) (0.387)
30-34 -0.141 -0.820 -0.119 -1.038 0.050 -0.781 0.025 -0.991 0.116 -1.404
(0.022) (0.306) (0.194) (0.470) (0.103) (0.357) (0.096) (0.395) (0.175) (0.567)
35-39 -0.238 0.550 -0.331 -0.611 -0.049 -0.665 -0.004 -0.833 0.046 -1.045
(0.119) (0.351) (0.240) (0.634) (0.103) (0.415) (0.111) (0.456) (0.206) (0.580)
40-44 -0.098 0.034 0.135 0.164 0.224 0.236 0.169 -0.105 0.409 -0.155
(0.118) (0.311) (0.246) (0.686) (0.128) (0.349) (0.125) (0.426) (0.228) (0.597)
45-49 -0.246 -0.098 -0.254 -0.084 -0.023 -0.101 -0.019 -0.404 0.059 -0.434
(0.133) (0.339) (0.259) (0.700) (0.138) (0.412) (0.135) (0.480) (0.234) (0.617)
50-54 -0.416 0.280 -0.628 0.289 -0.235 0.339 -0.038 0.021 0.075 -0.180
(0.152) (0.314) (0.275) (0.746) (0.164) (0.391) (0.152) (0.509) (0.262) (0.668)
55+ -0.972 0.244 -1.445 -0.018 -0.931 0.299 -0.322 0.001 -0.363 -0.384
(0.159) (0.310) (0.283) (0.691) (0.167) (0.382) (0.166) (0.521) (0.258) (0.633)
SCHOOLING 0.008 0.021 0.003 0.023 -0.002 0.191 0.010 -0.064 0.016 -0.079
0.008 (0.020) (0.015) (0.045) (0.009) (0.025) (0.008) (0.031) (0.015) (0.045)
TENURE -0.023 0.008 -0.043 0.033 -0.028 0.007 -0.016 0.002 -0.029 0.025
(0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.021) (0.005) (0.011) (0.006) (0.013) (0.009) (0.017)
MARRIED 0.308 -0.194 0.379 -0.902 0.103 -0.498 0.068 -0.857 0.046 -1.299
(0.078) (0.214) (0.163) (0.504) (0.080) (0.258) (0.063) (0.374) (0.206) (0.488)
FIRSTJOB -0.415 0.360 -0.765 0.869 -0.416 0.523 -0.388 0.441 -0.654 0.735
(0.093) (0.182) (0.196) (0.580) (0.103) (0.223) (0.095) (0.232) (0.181) (0.428)
LAYOFF 0.022 -0.642 -0.128 -1.381 -0.145 -0.611 -0.121 -0.741 -0.163 -0.865
(0.090) (0.241) (0.164) (0.574) (0.092) (0.285) (0.084) (0.262) (0.152) (0.373)
END FIXED 0.185 -0.124 0.343 -0.366 0.050 -0.347 0.068 -0.211 0.155 -0.252
(0.062) (0.172) (0.136) (0.334) (0.066) (0.203) (0.063) (0.206) (0.115) (0.294)
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE -0.021 -0.137 -0.082 -0.356 -0.006 -0.196 0.004 -0.267 -0.058 -0.427
(0.027) (0.061) (0.054) (0.160) (0.027) (0.070) (0.025) (0.094) (0.047) (0.152)
Sigma 0.979 2.800 0.823 1.724
(0.112) (0.357) (0.155) (0.451)
Split Population Equation
Miu 2.821 0.171 2.138 0.296 2.270 0.910
(0.150) (0.141) (0.172) (0.331) (0.189) (0.690)
UB -0.870 -0.085 -1.069 -0.378
(0.306) (0.797) (0.284) (0.758)
AGE -0.078 0.019 -0.085 0.032
(0.012) (0.025) (0.013) (0.034)
SCHOOLING -0.037 0.199 -0.044 0.264
(0.027) (0.067) (0.029) (0.108)
TENURE -0.038 0.012 -0.038 -0.017
(0.012) (0.030) (0.012) (0.042)
MARRIED 1.374 1.113 1.415 2.011
(0.264) (0.799) (0.278) (1.340)
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE -0.118 0.123 -0.118 0.209
(0.120) (0.184) (0.121) (0.218)
Log-likelihood
Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses
-5096.86
Transition to: Transition to: Transition to:
-5068.52 -5058.17 -5118.72
Transition to: Transition to:
-5102.62Figure 1: Cause-Specific Hazard Function - Employment Figure 2: Cause-Specific Hazard Function - Inactivity
Figure 3: Those Moving into Inactivity as a Proportion  Figure 4:  Non-recipient Employment Hazard Function
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UB=0Table 2: Simulations from the Split-Population Model*
UI=0 UI=1 UI=0 UI=1 UI=0 UI=1
Survival Rate after
   3 months 0.629 0.792 0.672 0.841 0.790 0.920
   12 months 0.257 0.466 0.321 0.574 0.474 0.723
   36 months 0.050 0.140 0.092 0.250 0.218 0.435
Defective Risk
   Employment 0.029 0.081 0.094 0.231 0.371 0.632
   Inactivity 0.390 0.483 0.287 0.370 0.173 0.234
Median Duration
(in months)
   two destinations 5 11 7 16 11 28
   until employment 7 14 7 21 24 na
* The simulations are derived using the fifth specification in Table 1
Age=20 Years Age=35 Years Age=50 YearsAppendix Table: Definition of Variables and Sample Means by Unemployment Benefit Recipiency and Destination
Recipient Nonrecipient 
Variable Unemployed Employed Inactive Unemployed Employed Inactive
DURATION 12.082 9.027 15.250 16.138 9.919 13.548
elapsed unemployment in months 
AGE 42.456 36.048 43.875 31.184 29.457 30.158
age in years
SCHOOLING 5.765 5.912 5.312 7.089 7.104 7.743
years of schooling completed
TENURE 10.221 5.739 11.775 4.159 2.749 4.215
years of tenure on previous job
JOBS 3.431 3.958 3.250 2.419 3.011 1.892
number of previous jobs
MARRIED 0.754 0.636 0.734 0.338 0.369 0.278
=1 if married, 0 otherwise
FIRSTJOB 0.234 0.174 0.361
=1 if looking for first job, 0 otherwise
LAYOFF 0.316 0.227 0.203 0.093 0.082 0.046
=1 if job lost by reason of mass layoff, 0 otherwise
END FIXED 0.243 0.382 0.266 0.244 0.332 0.174
=1 if job lost through termination of a fixed-term contract, 0 otherwise
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 6.648 6.570 6.684 6.557 6.498 6.388
quarterly unemployment rate
n 2770 330 64 4882 1164 241